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made to suffer in a general scheme of harassment. Assuming an injunction is
granted when the merit of the government's claim is determined, in light
of the factual situation in the present case, substantial policy reasons should
outweigh the necessary disregard for principles of comity. Also, because of
the obvious need for reform, it appears better to allow the question of one
man's guilt or innocence to remain undetermined in the wake of necessary
federal intervention than to let the situation worsen. Perhaps much of the
harassment has already resulted and part will outlive the present decision.
But, merely because one's hands are apt to become soiled again tomorrow
does not preclude the need for washing them today. The decision in the
instant case, if narrowly interpreted and applied, need not open a Pandora's
box filled with federal injunctions.
Robert J. Jackson
Ned W. Manashil
TRADE REGULATION-ANTITRUST LAWS-MANUFACTURER'S
REFUSAL To DEAL PERMITTED AGAINST RETAILER CHARGING
HIm WITH ANTITRUST VIOLATION.
Bergen Drug Co., Inc. v. Parke, Davis & Co. (D. N.J. 1961).
House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc. (2d Cir. 1962).
In 1959, the United States Supreme Court upheld a Federal Trade
Commission's cease and desist order against the Simplicity Pattern Com-
pany' because of Simplicity's discrimination against several of its customers
in violation of section 2(e) of the Clayton Antitrust Act.2 As a result,
several of the company's customers initiated treble damage suits against
Simplicity to recover for the loss they had suffered because of the latter's
unlawful policies.a Thereupon, the customers (the present plaintiffs) re-
1. Federal Trade Commission v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., 360 U.S. 55, 79
S. Ct. 1005 (1959).
2. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958): "(a) It shall be unlawful for
any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or
indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimina-
tion are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or
resale within the United States or any territory thereof or the District of Columbia
or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States
and where the effect of such disqrimination may be substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce or to injure, destroy or prevent
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of
such discrimination, or with customers of either of them .... That nothing contained
in sections 12, 13, 14-21, and 22-27 of this title shall prevent persons engaged in
selling goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own cus-
tomers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade."
3. 38 Stat. 730. (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958): "Any person who shall be in-
jured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws may sue therefor, in any district court of the United States in the district in
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ceived notice that Simplicity was permanently suspending all dealings with
them because of the legal action they had taken. Plaintiffs applied to the
district court for a preliminary injunction against Simplicity, claiming that
they were suffering irreparable damage4 and that defendant's course of
conduct was contrary to the policy enunciated by Congress in establish-
ing private antitrust remedies as an essential part of the statutory scheme
for the enforcement of the laws against monopoly.5 Defendant relied "on
the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely
private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to
parties with whom he will deal." The court granted the injunction de-
claring that public policy considerations outweighed one's right to deal
with whomever he chooses. 7 The circuit court of appeals reversed, holding
that "a customer could not compel a manufacturer to continue selling its
products to the customer during the pendency of its antitrust action against
the manufacturer even though the manufacturer's sole reason for refusing
to deal was to retalitate for the suit brought against it and to discourage
the customer from continuing the litigation."8 House of Materials, Inc..v.
Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., 298 F.2d 867 (2nd Cir. 1962).
In a similar case the district court of New Jersey reached the same
result. The Bergen Drug Company, a distributor of pharmaceutical
products, had filed a treble damage action against Parke, Davis Company,
a leading drug manufacturer. Immediately, Parke-Davis dropped Bergen as
a customer. In denying Bergen's application for injunctive relief, the court
held that the sole cause for a manufacturer's refusal to deal may be a
feeling of disapproval of its customer's pending litigation. Bergen Drug
Co., Inc. v. Parke, Davis & Co., ... F. Supp. ... (D. N.J. Oct. 18, 1961).
In United States v. Colgate & Co.," the United States Supreme Court
was concerned with Colgate's attempt to have its customers adhere to a
set range of resale prices. The Court reasoned that the facts showed a
complete sale by Colgate of its products and, hence, its customers were
free to do whatever they wished with the goods.' 0 The Court stated:
"... in the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,
which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the
amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
4. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958) : "Any person, firm, corporation, or
association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief . . . against
threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws, including sections
13, 14, 18, and 19 of this title, when and under the same conditions and principles as
injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted
by courts of equity . . . and upon the execution of proper bond against damages
for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the danger of irreparable
loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue."
5. P. W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 191 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D. N.Y.
1961).
6. Id. at 59.
7. Id. at 62.
8. House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., 298 F.2d 867
(2d Cir. 1962).
9. 250 U.S. 300, 39 S. Ct. 465 (1919).
10. Query whether this is correct in both theory and practice.
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the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manu-
facturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal; and of
course he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he
will refuse to sell."' 1 Although the Colgate doctrine has been limited by
subsequent decisions, 12 its influence is still felt today.' 3 In Federal Trade
Commission v. Beech-Nut,14 the manufacturer's right to refuse to deal was
reaffirmed, but with the warning that any action which went beyond
this would not be tolerated. There was even a suggestion that Colgate
might have been decided differently if a better indictment had been drawn.' 5
Beech-Nut can be distinguished from Colgate in that the Court in the
former case looked upon the manufacturer's use of wholesalers to coerce
retailers to conform to certain prices as a combination and not merely as
unilateral action by the manufacturer. It was stated that ". . . the non-
existence of contracts covering the practices was irrelevant since the
specific facts found show suppression of the freedom of competition by
methods in which the company secures the cooperation of its distributors
and customers which are quite as effective as agreements express or implied
intended to accomplish the same purpose."1 6 Although the Court in Parke-
Davis might have been content to rest its decision on these words, it went
on to condemn the manufacturer's attempt to achieve uniform adherence
by inducing each customer to adhere to avoid such price competition. 17
Consequently, the present state of the law seems to be that a simple uni-
lateral refusal to deal by a manufacturer will be upheld so long as no
element of conspiracy or combination is present. It should be noted that
proof of such a combination or conspiracy may be shown by mere in-
ference from the factual situation. There appears to remain only "a narrow
channel through which a manufacturer may pass even though the facts
have to be of such Doric simplicity as to be somewhat rare in this day of
complex business enterprise."' 8
11. Supra note 9, at 307, 39 S. Ct. at 468.
12. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 80 S. Ct. 503 (1960);
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 72 S. Ct. 181 (1951); Federal
Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 42 S. Ct. 150 (1922);
Warner v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., 277 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1960). Mr.
Justice Harlan once said: ". . . the Court has done no less than send to its demise the
Colgate doctrine." United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 49, 80 S.
Ct. 503, 514 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
13. Certainly, the courts in Simplicity and Bergen Drug seemed to consider
Colgate very much alive, although perhaps without the vitality it once had.
14. Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 42
S. Ct. 150 (1922). Beech-Nut encouraged wholesalers not to resell to retailers who
did not maintain certain prices. They specially marked their products to check
on those who did not conform. A list of violators was circulated among their
distributors who, in turn, refused to deal with those named thereon.
15. Id. at 452, 42 S. Ct. at 154.
16. Id. at 455, 42 S. Ct. at 155.
17. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra note 12, at 47, 80 S. Ct. at 513.
18. Warner v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., 277 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir.
1960).
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In light of the tests brought forth in Colgate and subsequent cases,
it would seem that the courts' decisions in Bergen Drug and Simplicity
were correct. In both there was unilateral action by the manufacturer in
refusing to deal. It does not appear that defendant in either case had a
monopoly and there was no evidence of any conspiracy or combination.
There were no charges that either of the sellers solicited cooperation from
any of its other customers. The cases definitely fit into the Colgate doctrine
as first handed down and even as limited by subsequent decisions. There-
fore, the whole problem revolves around the question of whether manu-
facturers with significant market power (but which power does not reach
the monopoly stage) should be permitted to attain by indirection what is
forbidden by direct action. The maxim of protecting "the much daunted
principle of free enterprise,"1 9 although theoretically sound, has been so
propagandized that the court, in the present case, should have been more
careful in applying this language so as to avoid reaching a decision the
effect of which is contrary to the very proposition upon which it relies. By
granting powerful manufacturers the right to choose their customers and
then allowing them to pervert this right in using it as leverage, smaller
dealers are forced to surrender their interest in the natural flow of
competition and, at the same time, the will of Congress, as found in the
antitrust laws,2 0 is subverted.
The fact that Congress, in enacting a criminal statute, provided that
violators be liable in a civil action and be subject to a treble damage
penalty, 21 is also of significance. These provisions were aimed at ac-
complishing a dual result. First, Congress hoped that private individuals
would be encouraged to aid government enforcement agencies in policing
this area ;22 secondly, the prospect of a treble damage award was intended to
act as a strong deterrent to anyone contemplating a violation of the anti-
trust laws.23 It has been stated that without the aid of private suits
the government's Antitrust division would require a budget four times
as great as is now necessary if present enforcement standards are to be
maintained. 24 Also, the fact that the later enactment of section 5 of the
Clayton Act 25 allows a civil plaintiff to use a government conviction under
19. Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., .... F. Supp .... (D. N.J.
Oct. 18, 1962).
20. Supra note 3.
21. Ibid.
22. Quemos Theatre Co., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949
(D. N.J. 1940). See also Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble
Damage Actions, 4 ANTrrRUsr BULL. 5 (1959); Wham, Antitrust Treble Damage
Suits: The Government's Chief Aid in Enforcement, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1954).
23. United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167,
171 (S.D. N.Y. 1955). The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized
these purposes as underlying the inclusion of the treble damage provision. Lawlor v.
National Screen Service Corp.;. 349 U.S. 322, 75 S. Ct. 865 (1955) ; Radovich v.
National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 77 S. Ct. 390 (1957).
24. Loevinger, The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167, 168
(1958).
25. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 16: "A final judgment or decree rendered
in any criminal prosecution or in any suit or proceeding in equity brought by or on
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the antitrust laws as prima facie proof of defendant's civil liability seems
to definitely indicate that Congress wishes to encourage such suits. The
second aspect is of still greater importance. Government officials have
readily acknowledged that the financial pinch on an antitrust defendant
achieved through the treble damage action is a substantial deterrent..2 6
Certainly, it can be inferred that Congress also intended to outlaw
coercive action aimed at preventing a private party from enforcing his
statutory right.
Just how much coercive power certain manufacturers possess in exer-
cising their option to deal or not is enlightening indeed. A refusal to deal
can easily be used as an economic weapon of persuasion and coercion to
accomplish forbidden objectives. 27 Naturally not every manufacturer has this
compulsive ability merely because he is a manufacturer. He needs that added
factor of market power. "Of course the power to injure a buyer by refusing
to deal implies the lack of alternative sources of supply to the buyer in ques-
tion, for if perfect substitutes were available, the refusal of any particular
supplier to sell would be a matter of indifference to the buyer."' 28 It might be
argued that there are many available substitutes for Simplicity and Parke-
Davis products. But a close examination reveals that this is not the case,
especially with regard to patterns. The industry is such that there are four
main producers. Simplicity is the largest, having a sales volume greater than
that of its three major competitors.29 Each shop selling patterns keeps
many books, each containing all the patterns of the major producers;
practically, a store must stock all such books in order to attract the aver-
age customer. If a shop lacks a large producer's book the effect would
almost certainly be devastating. Thus, a small retailer is nearly com-
pletely at the supplier's mercy. The situation in the drug field is similar,
although Parke-Davis' power is more limited than Simplicity's. Since
many people buy according to brand names, if a drug dealer is deprived
of the products of one of the leading manufacturers, his business is bound
to suffer seriously. Thus threatened, a small dealer can easily be drawn
into a conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws.
behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant
has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in
any suit or proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant under said
laws as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an
estoppel as between the parties thereto . . Whenever any suit or proceeding in
equity or criminal prosecution is instituted by the United States to prevent, restrain,
or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, the running of the statute of
limitations in respect to each and every private right of action arising under said
laws and based in whole or part on any matter complained of in said suit or
proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof."
26. United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., supra note 23, at 172,
173.
27. Note, 7 How. L.J. 181 (1961).
28. Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. IRv. 847,
871 (1954-55).
29. Federal Trade Commission v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., supra note 1, at 59,
79 S. Ct. at 1008.
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Several possible solutions present themselves. Of course, the easiest
answer would be to await Congressional action. However, this should
not be necessary. Since the present antitrust laws appear sufficient to enable
the courts to effectively handle the situation, there is no reason to delay.
Certainly, it can be inferred from the purpose of the legislation that an
indirect method of avoiding the law was not to be tolerated. "Should not
a court when confronted with a situation which would be unlawful if
enforced by contract, strike it down under the antitrust laws if it results
from the trader's individual decision not to deal with the customer or
class concerned?"3 A decision, such as the present one, reduces the re-
tailer's right to sue to a mere phrase on the statute books. Once this
right is snuffed out, powerful companies will easily be able to force small
dealers into future violations of the antitrust laws. Further, there would
seem to remain little incentive to restrain Simplicity or Bergen Drug
from continuing their previous illegal methods. Of course, the government
could subject them to a fine; but, so long as their ledgers show a hearty
profit, this will be a small deterrent. An express overruling of Colgate has
been suggested ;31 this seems neither desirable nor necessary. Obviously
there are situations wherein a seller has an unqualified right to refuse
to deal, for example, when the party is a competitor or is a bad credit risk.
Although the seller should not be deprived of his discretion in this limited
area, he also cannot be permitted to pervert the very purpose of the anti-
trust laws. The solution lies in an appraisal of the manufacturer's intent
in refusing to deal. If a valid business reason exists, the refusal should
be allowed; if coercion is intended, it should be struck down. The argument
that a manufacturer should not be made to deal with a party who has
initiated proceedings against him has little weight in today's impersonal
business world. Perhaps, as has been suggested, the Court, in declining to
overrule Colgate, ". . failed to follow its own mandate; that the antitrust
laws are concerned with economic realities, that they are aimed at sub-
stance rather than form."'8 2 The better course is that of the district court
in Simplicity and the Seventh Circuit in Becken v. Gemex Corp.33 The
latter case concerned the refusal of a manufacturer to deal with a whole-
saler who would not conform to a certain resale price maintenance pro-
gram. The elements of monopoly and combination were missing; never-
theless, the manufacturer's refusal to deal was struck down as an attempt
to evade the antitrust laws. The court said: ". . . a wrench can be used to
turn bolts and nuts. It can also be used to assault a person in a robbery.
Like a wrench, a manufacturer's right to stop selling to a wholesaler can
30. Barber, supra note 28, at 880.
31. Note, 58 YALz L.J. 1121, 1129 (1948-49) : "The Colgate case, still a symbol of
special immunity for all refusals to sell, should be expressly overruled at the
earliest opportunity." See also Note, 7 How L.J. 181, 186 (1961).
32. Rotatori, The Right to Refuse to Deal, 12 W. Rzs. L. Rpv. 759, 775 (1960-61).
33. Becken v. Gemex Corp., 272 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1959). Here a watch manu-
facturer attempted to force a distributor to maintain a certain price scale; when the
distributor refused, the manufacturer discontinued sales to him.
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